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Abstract 
The Intricacies of Tax & Globalization review explores the effect of globalization 
on taxation.  It looks into the available data (particularly from the OECD and EU) to 
explore global trends in taxation over the past three decades to evaluate whether and to 
what extent globalization leads to convergence or divergence of national tax policies, 
and to assess the merit of such changes.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he comparative study of tax law is not strictly theoretically oriented . . . 
rather it is a study of what may indeed become a reality in the foreseeable future . . . .”1 
The field of taxation is often criticized for being technical in nature and lacking a 
broad contextual perspective.2  With their expansive comparative analysis, Avi-Yonah, 
Sartori, and Marian (hereinafter "the authors") underscore a new trend in the study and 
teaching of tax law by relying on and appreciating the value of local and international 
conditions that affect taxation.3  Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law comes at a 
time when increased forces of globalization have fueled a resurgence in comparative 
legal analysis,4 and comparative taxation law is concurrently beginning to develop into its 
own sub-discipline, introducing a rich literature of growing value.5 
Avi-Yonah, Sartori, and Marian cautiously assert that to date, no distinct method 
of comparative taxation law—with its unique characteristics, processes, techniques, and 
approach to evaluation—has emerged.6  For this reason, the authors rely on what they 
                                                     
1 REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INCOME 
TAXATION LAW, xviii (2011). 
2 See, e.g., Omri Marian, The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 
(2010); Carlo Garbarino, Comparative Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case of Transplant of 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 765 (2010) (discussing the missed promise 
of comparative taxation); Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary and Structural Approach to Comparative 
Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677 (2009) (exploring methods of 
comparative taxation and offering an outline of an evolutionary approach to this emerging field). 
3 See, e.g., Introduction, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 469, 469 (2010) (According to the 
editors, this volume is dedicated to comparative tax scholarship and "evokes a tension inherent in the study of 
comparative law under conditions of globalization, between global legal convergence and [social, political, 
and economic] diversity.").  These issues concern contextual questions such as: "Can law be productively 
compared across cultures? Can it be effectively transferred across cultures? Which elements in law . . . ought 
to be examined by scholars interested in comparative analysis and in the assessment of global process? And 
what, if anything, can such comparison teach us for local purposes?"  Id. 
4 See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY & THE FUTURE OF WORLD 
ECONOMY (2012); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2007); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND EGALITARIAN REDISTRIBUTION (Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles & Michael Wallerstein 
eds., 2006); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS (2002). 
5 Garbarino, Comparative Taxation and Legal Theory, supra note 2, at 766 ("[A]fter a long period 
of poor development, the debate among scholars of comparative tax law is now building up and a new web of 
communication and methods is beginning to evolve."); see also VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING 
WORLD (1995); INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING I (Victor Thuronyi ed. 1996); 
HUGH AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (1997); INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING II (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998); VICTOR THURONYI, 
COMPARATIVE TAX LAW (2003); Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and 
Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 119 (2005); Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to 
Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, supra note 2; GIANLUIGI BIZIOLI & CLAUDIO 
SACCHETTO, TAX ASPECTS OF FISCAL FEDERALISM – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2011); TAX LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds., 2013). 
6 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 1 ("[L]egal corporatists have usually adopted 
well-defined comparative methods that are used in general comparative legal studies.").  In particular, the 
authors suggest that given the breadth of methods available for legal comparison, there may be little actual 
need for a single, all-inclusive method of comparative taxation law.  They explain:  
[O]ne of the main problems with comparative study of law is that there are probably as many 
approaches to it as there are comparative scholars.  Although over the past three decades or so, 
legal comparatists have fiercely debated what approaches should be deemed appropriate when 
conducting a comparative study of law, they have failed to produce any coherent outcome . . . we 
cannot possibly point to a single approach that can be regarded as superior to others.  Indeed, given 
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describe as a functional, problem-solving method in their analysis.7  Specifically, Global 
Perspectives on Income Taxation Law covers those topics customarily taught in a basic 
U.S. income taxation law course, but through a less commonly explored comparative 
prism.8  The authors discuss topics that range from the concepts of taxable income and 
tax deductions, through the taxpaying unit, tax accounting, and the taxation of capital 
gains and losses, to the problem of tax avoidance, issues in business taxation, and 
selected topics in international tax law.9  The authors frequently consider the approach 
followed in the U.S. as a benchmark for analysis.  For each topic, however, they also 
explore the tax policy alternatives implemented in other countries, including Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
and Israel.10 
The underlying premise of the book is that tax law is best understood by 
exploring its variable development in the global sphere.  Such a broad perspective 
facilitates a better understanding of not only the U.S. tax system, but also the range of tax 
policy alternatives for meeting challenges that often have much in common across 
different countries and tax jurisdictions. 11   In addition, a comparative perspective is 
particularly useful in taxation because of the constantly changing and contingent nature 
of taxation law, which virtually makes it a cross-border field.12  Against this backdrop, a 
globally centered tax analysis facilitates discussions and strategies that reach beyond 
                                                                                                                                                 
that these approaches represent different ideological views, we should probably not be able to reach 
an agreement among ourselves as to the most promising method of comparative tax research. 
Id. at 2–3; see also id. at xvi ("[W]hat we are . . . offering here is a general approach to comparative tax 
studies that goes beyond the view of comparative taxation as an autonomous field of legal studies."). 
7 Id. at 4 ("[T]he functional approach to comparative law has a long-established tradition and is 
probably the most widely adopted.  Comparative legal functionalism rests on the assumption that 'the legal 
system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite different 
means, though very often with similar results.'") (citing KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (1998)); see also id. at 12 ("[The book] follows, to a certain extent, a comparative 
law and economics perspective in a problem-solving-oriented manner."); but cf. id ("[T]his mode of 
explanatory analysis is primarily technical.  Namely, it does not seek to advance a particular normative 
choice."). 
8 Id. at 16 ("[T]he organization of the book is designed to help the tax student follow the book in 
parallel with the regular casebook that he or she is using.  Since most U.S. tax casebooks follow a basic 
pattern (income, deductions, the taxable unit, timing, capital gains, and so on), the book will follow the same 
order."). 
9 Id. at vii–x (table of contents). 
10 But see id. at 16 ("A critical comparatist will probably be quick to note this construction and may 
even criticize us for trying to manipulate foreign tax systems to accommodate the 'mainstream' American 
discourse.  Point taken.  We invite, by all means, critical tax comparatists to bring forward a critical analysis 
on the construction of comparative tax discourse around these usual focal points.  This would be a much 
needed (and long overdue) contribution [to] the comparative tax discourse."). 
11 See, e.g., Geoffery Hornsey, Corporate Taxation – A Comparative Study, 16 MOD. L. REV. 26 
(1953) (concluding from a comparative study conducted on corporate taxation in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France during the 1950s that "the one striking fact which does emerge is the 
universality of the problems involved and the similarity of the solutions achieved."); AVI-YONAH, SARTORI & 
MARIAN, supra note 1, at 22 ("[A]t least from a functional perspective, the design problems facing an income 
tax are, to a significant extent, identical across jurisdictions.").  Note, however, the risk of a sampling issue 
with respect to the countries selected for comparison: these countries already have much in common so they 
are likely to produce similar tax challenges and solutions.  See also supra note 10. 
12 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI & MARIAN, supra note 1, at xvii ("[T]hese issues are of real importance, 
first and foremost, because one of the defining characteristics of tax laws is that they are constantly changing 
at an amazingly rapid pace . . . ."); see also infra notes 24–43, 72–81 and accompanying text (addressing the 
interdependency of taxation among nations and suggesting it is particularly exacerbated by globalization). 
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immediate domestic rules and mechanisms to allow both the expression of and reflection 
on underlying tax policy issues and solutions in a world that is closely interconnected and 
constantly evolving.13 
Avi-Yonah, Sartori, and Marian’s aim is not to make the reader of Global 
Perspectives on Income Taxation Law a foreign tax expert, but to provide readers with a 
wide comparative outlook on fundamental elements of income taxation law.14  While 
much of the legal tax education still lags behind actual tax practice due to its 
predominantly self-reliant approach, Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law adds 
indispensible value by redirecting and broadening the discussion on tax. Although it is 
tailored to the prospective attorney first and foremost, 15  the book reaches beyond 
classroom borders.  It is designed to be "the start, not the end" and serves "to ignite 
modes of thinking."16  The authors posit that the reader is free to choose how to utilize the 
information the book provides.17  To this end they present a manuscript that advances the 
comparative tax law dialogue in a meaningful yet accessible manner. 
II. GLOBALIZATION AND TAXATION LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF A 
CLOSER-KNIT WORLD 
Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law describes and examines tax policy 
arrangements across different jurisdictions, focusing on the law of income taxation, 
particularly personal income taxation.  This comparative endeavor provides unique 
insight into global tax trends of the past three and a half decades, especially those trends 
that involve national decisions on the tax mix, including: what forms of economic 
income, goods, and services to tax; to what extent to tax these items; and how 
globalization limits and otherwise affects taxation in the twenty-first century.18  This 
insight is essential for evaluating globalization’s effects on taxation, taking into account 
                                                     
13 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI & MARIAN, supra note 1, at xiii.  Jinyan Li’s analysis of the GAAR 
implementation in Canada and China is a good example of how globally centered tax analysis offers a 
particularly useful and in-depth perspective.  Li notes that while the purpose of both GAARs is anti-
avoidance, the policy underlying this legislation does not automatically translate into the Chinese culture.  
This mismatch leads to a very different GAAR implementation in the two countries.  Jinyan Li, Tax 
Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian GAAR, 11 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES LAW 655, 681 (2010).  A similar argument in favor of exploring underlying tax policy decisions 
before transplanting them is also one of the main points made in Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: 
Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the United States, 32 Va. Tax Rev. 133, 203 (2012) ("[A]s much as a 
comparative approach [in the corporate tax context] is desirable, it is also dangerous if ill executed.  Bad 
comparisons produce inaccurate guidance that may not bring about the desired results of tax reform."). 
14 Exploring key elements of income taxation law from a comparative perspective is a key goal for 
the authors.  See, e.g., AVI-YONAH, SARTORI & MARIAN, supra note 1, at xix ("[A]ny future lawyer should, at 
the minimum, understand some basic notions of foreign taxation."). 
15 See, e.g., id. at xiii (addressing the issue of student readership and noting that, despite a revival of 
comparative tax law scholarship, no book currently exists for student consumption). 
16 Id. at 16. 
17 Id. 
18 Cf. Neil Brooks & Thaddeus Hwong, Tax Levels, Structures, and Reforms: Convergence or 
Persistence, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 791 (2010) (exploring the effect of globalization on three 
components of the tax mix: (1) individual tax rates and revenue; (2) corporate tax rates and revenue; and (3) 
the tax base, particularly VAT and its expansion); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Convergence and 
Globalization 1 (Pub. L. and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 214, 2010) (arguing 
that, due to globalization, convergence can be detected in several areas of taxation, including: (1) countries' 
overall tax mix (defined as the composition of total tax revenue that usually includes personal and corporate 
income taxes, social security contributions, property taxes, excise taxes, and the like); (2) issues of 
corporate/shareholder tax integration; and (3) the choice between worldwide and territorial taxation). 
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its risks and benefits, and exploring the mechanisms available to governments to manage 
and otherwise address these effects. 
Tax law comparatists generally share the belief that the world has become 
increasingly globalized after the mid-1980s.19  As a historical process above all else, 
globalization has significantly, albeit sometimes subtly, affected key aspects of national 
performance.20  The term globalization usually refers to the increased integration and 
liberalization of markets around the world.21  Globalization, however, encompasses a 
wider array of forces, including human innovation, technological progress, and the 
convergence of social and cultural norms.22  These forces are often understood to pull 
nations together, forming a close-knit world. 23   Despite vast differences in national 
characteristics—including language, history, location, and natural resources—one 
implication of globalization’s increased closeness is that forces at play within any one 
country can easily cause a chain reaction, transcending traditional borders to shape and 
affect other sovereign nations.24   This cross-country dependency generates ripples of 
                                                     
19 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Tax Convergence and Globalization, supra note 18, at 1 (indicating that 
the "period of globalization" commenced "from around 1980, [when] most countries began relaxing 
restrictions on capital mobility"); James R. Hines, Jr. & Lawrence H. Summers, How Globalization Affects 
Tax Design, 23 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 123, 134 (Jeffrey R. Brown et al. eds., 2009) ("The incentive 
to reduce corporate tax rates in order to attract foreign direct investment has increased since the early 1980s, 
as levels of world foreign direct investment rose sharply during that time."); International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Staff, Globalization: A Brief Overview, 2 IMF ISSUES BRIEF 1–2 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm ("The term 'globalization' began to be used more commonly in the 
1980s, reflecting technological advances that made it easier and quicker to complete international 
transactions – both trade and financial flows."). 
20 The precise origin of globalization is debatable and generally depends on the scope and breadth 
of one’s conceptualization of it.  Some historians date globalization as far back as the third millennium B.C., 
while modern globalization is generally understood to have begun in the late nineteenth century.  
Notwithstanding the exact origin of globalization, its definition and various applications continue to evolve.  
For instance, debates over globalization and its effect on international tax neutrality began as early as the 
Kennedy Administration and continue to this date.  See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, The Connection Between 
Competitiveness and International Taxation, 65 TAX L. REV. 349, 363 (2012) (explaining that "Since the 
Kennedy Administration, two neutrality principles have dominated U.S. international tax policy and the 
debate over what that policy should be: capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN).").  
See also id. at 363–69 (further discussing CEN and CIN). 
21 IMF Staff, supra note 19, at 3–4 (indicating, for example, that "[a] core element of globalization 
is the expansion of world trade through the elimination or reduction of trade barriers").  
22 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Summer 1997, at 19, 27 ("As the technology for manufactured goods becomes standardized and diffused 
internationally, nations with different sets of values, norms, institutions, and collective preferences begin to 
compete head on in markets for similar goods.”); see also Hines & Summers, supra note 19, at 126–27 ("The 
world economy has grown considerably more open and integrated in every decade since the Second World 
War . . . . While this reflects in part the growth of the world economy, it also reflects the impact of reduced 
transportation and communication costs, falling tariff rates, and reductions in other impediments to 
international business."). 
23 See, e.g., IMF Staff, supra note 19, at 7 (using the 2007-2008 financial crisis to illustrate how 
close-knit the world has become as a result of globalization: "Credit market strains have intensified and 
spread across asset classes and banks, precipitating a financial shock that many have characterized as the 
most serious since the 1930’s.  [This episode is a reminder] that a breakdown in globalization—meaning a 
slowdown in the global flows of goods, services, capital, and people—can have extremely adverse 
consequences."); see also THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE DELL THEORY OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, EMERGING: A 
READER 49 (Barclay Barrios. ed. 2008) (examining the impact of the "flattening" of the world due to forces 
of globalization and stating that "globalized trade, outsourcing, supply-chaining, and political forces have 
[all] changed the world permanently, for both better and worse."). 
24 For a pragmatic view of the cross-border tax dependency effect of globalization, see, e.g., Brian 
Purcell, How the U.S. Corporate Rate Could Compete with Ireland, INT’L TAX REV., Dec.-Jan. 2012, at 21, 
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cause and effect so powerful that taxation runs the risk—or enjoys the benefit—of being 
redefined on a national, as well as international, level.25 
Importantly, as nations become increasingly interdependent, their risk of being 
pressured into tax competition also intensifies.  Broadly stated, tax competition involves a 
strategic, non-cooperative interaction among nations,26 with each nation designing its tax 
system in response to the tax arrangements of other countries to attract and retain 
productive resources. 27   To be exact, competitive tax interactions are not limited to 
nations and generally require additional parties, particularly multinational corporations, 
but also other incorporated entities, households, and individuals.28 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 (arguing that the U.S. and the E.U. should stop complaining that Ireland’s corporate tax rate is "unfair" 
and, instead, lower their own corporate rates). 
25 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), TAX POLICY REFORM AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 20 at Box 1.1 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/taxpolicystudyno20-
taxpolicyreformandeconomicgrowth.htm ("[The effects of globalization] mean that individual countries are 
likely to make different tax policy choices from those they would have made in the past, when there was less 
mobility."); see also Vito Tanzi, Remarks at the Conference Organized by the School of International 
Studies, University of Trento: Globalization and International Harmonization of Tax Systems 8 (May 27, 
2004), transcript available at http://www.unitn.it/files/download/9722/wptanzitanno.pdf ("What has happened 
during the last 20 years is that with the liberalisation of trade, and the enormous movements of capital at an 
incredible pace (each day the equivalent of the Italian GDP [from one country to another]) . . . domestic fiscal 
problems start to become international problems, and this has consequences."). 
26 See, e.g., Tanzi, supra note 25, at 8 ("The global economy has become a sort of commons, like 
the oceans or the atmosphere, which a shrewd country may exploit for its own purposes.  For example, by 
radically lowering tax rates on incomes from financial activities one can attract capital from other 
countries."); see also VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 6 (1994) ("Like tectonic plates 
grinding against each other, the tax systems of different countries will develop arbitrage pressures created by 
different tax rates, by differences in the bases that are taxed, by different possibilities of avoidance and 
evasion, and so forth.").  Importantly, tax competition may also occur on a sub-national level.  For an 
empirical analysis of this phenomenon, see, e.g., OECD, TAX COMPETITION BETWEEN SUB-CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENTS (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/48817035.pdf (finding, for example, 
that "tax competition is not only an issue for federal countries, but also for unitary countries where local 
governments often have far-reaching tax autonomy").  Id. at 5; see also id. at 7–8 (introducing the concepts of 
"vertical and horizontal tax competition").   
27 Importantly, the strategic, non-cooperative interaction entailed in tax competition presumes that 
any benefit for one economic actor is necessarily gained at the expense of other actors, under the framework 
of a zero-sum game.  From the early 1980s to about the late 1990s, a key manifestation of the non-
cooperative tax dynamics among nations took the form of traditional tax havens, where jurisdictions offered 
no—or significantly reduced—tax on investments with little or no commitment to the region.  More recently, 
tax competition often takes the form of production tax havens, which became common in countries like 
Ireland, where a low rate (12.5%) is given to foreign corporations who move their manufacturing to that 
country.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1579, 1601 (2000); Rodrik, Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, 
supra note 22, at 23 (explaining that globalization allows corporations to "go abroad" to find the best 
"prices," putting nations in a competitive stance against each other for corporate investment).  
28 Eric Toder explains: 
We [the United States] . . . compete with other nations . . . We compete to attract productive 
resources, such as high-skilled workers or investment capital. U.S. and foreign-resident 
corporations compete with each other in international markets, and corporations can exert some 
choice about where to establish and maintain residence.  Governments may exert competing claims 
against each other for tax revenues associated with economic activities that transcend national 
boundaries. 
Eric Toder, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: WHO COMPETES 
AGAINST WHOM FOR WHAT? 5 (2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/368-toderpdf.  But 
cf. Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in the Global 
Market and Create Jobs for American Workers, Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 9 2-3 
(2011) (statement of Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, Congressional Research Service), 
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One commonly invoked example of the strain that globalization places on the 
dynamics among nations—particularly its inducement of national and international tax 
competition—concerns the taxation of capital income, or the deficiency thereof.29  Many 
consider it to be an axiom of modern globalization that it involves the relaxation of trade 
barriers, leading to the enhanced mobility of productive resources, especially capital.30  
As capital increases its mobility relative to other economic resources, there is a natural 
shift in the tax base from capital to other, less agile, sources.31  For example, consumption 
taxes, such as the Value Added Tax (VAT) and General Sale Tax (GST), tend to fall on 
consumers who are generally less mobile than capital holders and producers.32  The latter 
groups possess a greater ability to respond to taxation by strategically adjusting their 
economic choices to minimize their tax liability.33  In recognition of this propensity, 
                                                                                                                                                 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/gravelle.pdf (suggesting that, despite its 
widespread use, the term competitiveness is ill fitted when it comes to nations: "Although the term 
competitiveness has been invoked in the debate about U.S. policy in the global economy, it is not countries 
that are competitive, it is companies that are. A company generally thinks of itself as competitive if it can 
produce at the same cost as, or a lower cost than, other firms.  But a county’s firms cannot be competitive in 
all areas.  Indeed, even if firms in a county are more productive in all other countries in every respect, a 
county would still tend to produce those goods in which its relative advantage is greatest and trade with other 
countries for the goods they do not have a relative advantage in productivity . . . .  In sum, companies 
compete, and countries trade.").  
29 In the context of capital taxation, the data suggests that the real difficulty concerns capital 
income taxes that are source-based (such as the corporate income tax) or that are based on corporate 
residence, which is more easy to shift overseas than individual residence.  This is compared with capital 
income taxes that are residence-based at the individual taxpayers level, that do not suffer from the same 
movable tax bases problems.  See Rosanne Altshuler et. al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in 
Global Economy, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 355 (2010) (making the assertion that because the U.S. taxes on capital 
gains and dividends do not distinguish between gains and dividends arising from assets in the U.S. and assets 
located elsewhere, they do not cause an outflow of capital from the US.  Accordingly, the author advance a 
proposition for reducing the (source-based) U.S. corporate tax rate and increasing the (residence-based) U.S. 
tax on individuals’ capital gains and dividends). 
30 See, e.g., IMF Staff, Globalization: A Brief Overview, supra note 19, at 4 ("Global capital flows 
fluctuated between 2 and 6% of world GDP during the period 1980–95, but since then they have risen to 
14.8% of GDP, and in 2006 they totaled $7.2 trillion, more than tripling since 1995."). 
31 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retrospective After a 
Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783, 789–90 (2008–2009); but see OECD, supra note 25, at 20, Box 1.1 
(addressing the increased mobility of labor and explaining that "[i]t is generally assumed that choices related 
to corporate taxation are most affected by globalization because of the ease with which multinational 
enterprises can move the location of at least some of their activities.  However, highly skilled workers are 
also becoming more mobile and some countries are taking this into account in designing their personal tax 
systems.  In contrast, the taxation of lower-skilled workers and of consumption is seen as being less affected 
by globalization because these taxes are less mobile."). 
32 The VAT and GST are different names for what is essentially the same type of tax.  To illustrate 
the relatively inelastic and regressive nature of this tax, consider the following excerpt during a U.S. 
Congressional hearing on the Value Added Tax, in response to a question on who bears the burden of VAT:  
 [With a consumption tax, such as the VAT] [t]he burden is borne by consumption.  And so, it 
depends on what your consumption is relative to your income.  People with low incomes consume 
virtually all of their income.  People in the middle bracket save some.  That would not be taxed.  
People in the upper brackets save almost all of their income. . . .  
Tax Reform and Consumption- Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th 
Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of Mr. Bruce Bartlett, Former Domestic Policy Adviser to President Ronald 
Reagan, Columnist, Tax Notes, The Fiscal Times, Contributor to The New York Times) (emphasis added), 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=289865.  See also 
infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
33 See, e.g., Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 793 ("[T]axes on capital income will be reduced as 
countries compete for corporate investments and as the increased mobility of capital makes enforcement of 
capital taxes difficult or impossible . . . .").  Cf. Hines & Summers, supra note 19, at 126 (explaining that: "In 
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governments seek to stabilize revenues and limit the economic distortions stemming from 
tax planning by levying taxes in circumstances, and with respect to resources, that are 
less responsive to tax; the result has been, inter alia, a worldwide rise of the VAT and 
GST and a corresponding aversion towards the taxation of capital, especially on the 
corporate end.34 
Furthermore, the increased mobility of productive resources intensifies the 
pressure on all countries to compete for these resources by lowering their tax rates and, 
subsequently, strategically broadening their bases.35  It is against this backdrop that tax 
comparatists commonly argue that globalization has resulted in an increased worldwide 
reliance on consumption taxes, accompanied by a corresponding "flattening" of personal 
income tax rates and drastic reduction in corporate income tax brackets.36  According to a 
2011 OECD report on tax trends among OECD member countries: 
In the mid-1980s, many OECD countries had top marginal personal 
income tax (PIT) rates in the excess of 65%.  Today most top rates are 
below, and in some cases substantially below, 50% . . . .  Similarly, top 
statutory corporate income tax rates in the 1980s were rarely less than 
45%.  In 2011, the OECD average rate was below 26%.37 
Compared with personal income taxation, corporate tax rates exhibit a 
particularly steep decline during the past three and a half decades.  The 2010 U.S. 
President’s Economic Advisory Board Report on Tax Reform Options illustrates this 
drop in both the U.S. corporate tax rate and the average and median corporate tax rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
a globalizing world, expenditures have relatively clear geographic associations, reducing the potential for 
international tax avoidance and generally reducing the mobility of the tax base compared to alternatives such 
as personal income taxes or source-based business taxes including corporate income tax."). 
34 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  See also OECD, CONSUMPTION TAX TRENDS 2012: 
VAT/GST AND EXCISE RATES, TRENDS AND ADMINISTRATION ISSUES 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.oecdilibrary. org/taxation/consumption-tax-trends-2012_ctt-2012-en ("VAT is the most 
widespread general consumption tax in the world having been implemented by over 150 countries and in 33 
of the 34 OECD countries."); Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 793 (indicating that "there will be a shift to 
immobile and more regressive tax bases such as consumption, payrolls, and real property"); Avi-Yonah, Tax 
Convergence and Globalization, supra note 18, at 3–4 (exploring the implications of tax-base mobility and 
noting that "[t]he shift to dual income taxes and the shift in the corporate tax from production to consumption 
locations reflect the same concern about the vanishing [income tax] base"). 
35 OECD, TAX REFORM TRENDS IN OECD COUNTRIES 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/48193734.pdf  Importantly, broadening the tax base is not necessarily beneficial in 
the competition for investments because this generally raises the effective tax rate.  A lower rate broader base 
tax, however, may lead to a shift in reported income, which is more sensitive to the statutory tax rate than real 
investments.  See Toder, supra note 28.  See also Michael Keen, Tax Competition, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2008); Michael Devereux, Ben Lockwood, & Michaela Redoano, Capital 
Account Liberalization and Corporate Tax (IMF Working Paper No. 03/180, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm (demonstrating how capital account liberalization, in particular, tends 
to lead to lower corporate tax rates and increases strategic interactions among countries). 
36 Note, however, that personal rates have been undergoing a process of "flattening" over 
approximately the past 20 years, while the reduction in marginal personal and corporate rates has been 
evident for a period of about 30 years.  Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 802–14.  For an argument 
suggesting that over a longer-term perspective no convergence of nominal corporate tax rates can be seen, see 
Omri Marian, Do Tax Laws Truly Converge? A Case Study of Corporate Tax Rates in 11 Industrialized 
Countries, in The Discursive Failure In Comparative Tax Law, 121, 137–43 (unpublished S.J.D. Thesis 
presented at the University of Michigan Law School) (2009). 
37 OECD, supra note 35, at 3.  See also id. at 4, fig.1 ("The trend toward reduced [personal income] 
marginal tax rates started in the mid-1980s in most countries, with the U.S. reforms of 1986 being 
particularly influential.  In the late 1970s it was not uncommon to find top marginal personal income tax rates 
above 70%, while these rates are now well below 50% in a majority of OECD countries.").  
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for OECD member countries.  The U.S. statutory corporate tax rate dropped from 50% in 
1981 to close to 40% in 2009, while OECD member countries experienced a decrease in 
median and average rates from approximately 47% in 1981 to about 28% in 2009.38  
Likewise, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Globalization, Financial 
Markets, and Fiscal Policy Report, since the mid-1980s statutory corporate tax rates in 
industrial countries have declined from an average of about 45 percent in 1982 to 
approximately 35 percent in 2004, with a similar downward trend in effective rates.39 
Despite drastic reductions in corporate income tax rates, evidence for the period 
from 1965 to 2010 shows that, over time, total OECD corporate revenues as a percentage 
of total receipts not only remained stable but, in fact, slightly increased. 40  
Notwithstanding the significance of this finding, even though corporate tax revenues may 
appear robust, they could easily decline if tax competition intensifies, as globalization 
might entail. For example, according to Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic 
                                                     
38 THE PRESIDENT’S ECONOMIC ADVISORY BOARD REPORT ON TAX REFORM OPTIONS: 
SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 68, fig. 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf (exploring the 
combined federal and state corporate tax rate and explaining that "As a result of these differences between the 
U.S. and the OECD countries, U.S. firms operating abroad report that they often face higher effective tax 
rates on their overseas activities than foreign competitor firms.  In addition to affecting the international 
competitiveness of U.S. firms, the growing gap between the U.S. [statutory] corporate tax rate and the 
corporate tax rates of most other countries generates incentives for U.S. corporations to shift their income and 
operations to foreign locations with lower corporate tax rates to avoid U.S. taxes.  Over time as corporate tax 
rates have fallen around the world, these incentives have become stronger.").  Id. at 69; cf. id. at 65 ("The 
United States has the second highest statutory corporate income tax rate in the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) behind Japan.  Despite the high statutory rate, the average effective 
tax rate paid by corporations is close to the OECD median, and the corporate tax raises relatively little 
revenue—the fourth lowest in the OECD as a share of GDP."). 
39 IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department, Globalization, Financial Markets, and Fiscal Policy, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 6 (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm (indicating, 
however, that not all countries react to globalization in a similar manner, with some countries affected more 
adversely than others).  For example, "the decline [in corporate tax rates] has been especially pronounced in 
some EU countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Sweden, and also in emerging market 
countries in Europe . . . The evidence for emerging markets in Asia and Latin America also suggests a recent 
decline in corporate tax rates."  Id.; AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 129–30, n.138 (citing 
an OECD report indicating that 17 OECD member countries experienced a decline in average statutory 
corporate tax rate from 50.9% in 1982 to 38.3% in 1997); id. at 138 (suggesting that evidence for all OECD 
member countries demonstrates a consistent drop from an average statutory corporate tax rate of 33.6% in 
2000 to an average of 28.4% in 2006, and adding that similar findings are available for corporate effective 
marginal and effective average rates); cf. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 36, 39 (2005), available at 
http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/69xx/doc6902/11-28-corporatetax.pdf; OECD, Policy Brief, 
Reforming Corporate Income Tax, OECD OBSERVER, July 2008, at 3 fig.2, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/41069272.pdf (illustrating the decline in average effective 
corporate tax rates (AETR) from 1982 to 2005).  Avi-Yonah, Saratori and Marian suggest that the trend of 
rate reduction is also evident for developing countries.  AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 
138–39. 
40 See AVI-YONAH, SARATORI & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 141 n.144 (citing an NBER study 
reporting that since the 1970s, of all the G7 countries, only Japan showed evidence of a substantial decline in 
corporate tax revenues); IMF, supra note 39, at 6 ("[D]espite the reduction in statutory and effective tax rates, 
corporate tax revenue had held up well.  Indeed, industrial countries have experienced an increase in 
corporate tax revenue on average, both relative to GDP and to total tax revenue.").  However, while the 
overall OECD total suggests that corporate revenues as a percentage of total receipts has slightly increased 
over time, this trend varies from nation to nation.  See OECD, REVENUE STATISTICS 2012, at 110 tbl.12 
(2012), available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/revenue-statistics-2012_rev_stats-2012-en-fr 
(comparing corporate taxes as a percentage of total receipts from 1965 to 2010). 
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Policy of the Congressional Research Service, any gains from cutting corporate rates 
"would be reduced if other countries responded to a U.S. rate cut by reducing their own 
taxes."41  This domino effect in tax rate cuts is a very real possibility, as "evidence 
suggests that the U.S. [corporate tax] rate cut in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 might have 
triggered rate cuts in other countries."42  In fact, data for the U.S. depicts a drastic drop in 
corporate tax revenues since 1950, from approximately 26% of total tax receipts to only 
8% in 2010.43  
In addition, the observed upward trend in total OECD corporate tax revenues, as 
a percentage of total receipts, is likely to be the result of a number of factors.  Some of 
these factors may not necessarily represent a true increase in collection, but rather mask 
other economic developments.  Such are, for example, greater corporate profitability and 
a shift in the income tax base from personal to corporate, as taxpayers take advantage of 
incorporation and the associated lower tax rates.44  This, in turn, leads to a growing 
corporate sector that yields more taxes mainly due to its increased volume.45  Worldwide 
corporate tax-base broadening, particularly among OECD member countries, is another 
potential contributor to the improved corporate revenue yield.46 
                                                     
41 Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in 
the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers, supra note 28, at Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, 
Congressional Research Service), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/gravelle.pdf; 
see also OECD, supra note 35, at 6 fig.6 ("The tax cuts introduced by [corporate and personal tax reforms] 
have not led to a fall in the overall tax burden (measured by the tax-to-GDP ratio) . . . Indeed, the overall 
trend in tax burdens was upward until 2000" and increased again in 2006 and 2007, with another dip after the 
fiscal crisis due to decreased economic activity); but see Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition 
Report, supra note 31, at 790 ("While in developed countries this decline in rates was matched by a 
broadening of the tax base, so that no decline in revenues can be observed, in developing countries the same 
period witnessed a decline of corporate tax revenues by about 20% on average.  This decline is particularly 
important in light of the larger share of tax revenues produced by the corporate tax in developing countries 
(an average of 17%) as opposed to developed countries (an average of 7%)."). 
42 Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in 
the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers, supra note 28, at 9 (statement of Jane Gravelle).  
Cf. OECD, supra note 35, at 5 (attributing the inception of the corporate income tax rate reduction trend to 
the UK and USA tax reforms undertaken in the mid-1980s). 
43 Memorandum from Senator Carl Levin, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Hearings on 
Offshore Profit Shifting, submitted as evidence for the Congressional Hearing on Sept. 20, 2012, exhibit #1b, 
available at  
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/subcommittee-hearing-to-examine-billions-
of-dollars-in-us-tax-avoidance-by-multinational-corporations/?section=alltypes  (follow the hyperlink to "PSI 
Charts on Offshore Profit Shifting") (depicting a downward trend in U.S. corporate revenues from the 1950s 
and a plateau since the 1990s).  The memorandum also indicates that as corporate revenues decreased from 
1950 to 2010, payroll taxes increased from about 8% of tax revenue in 1950 to approximately 40% in 2010.  
Id. at 4–5 (follow the hyperlink to "PSI Memo on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code".). 
44 This is true in most of the OECD where the personal rate is higher than the corporate rate, but not 
so much in the U.S., where the top statutory rates have differed little in the past 25 years.  See, e.g., Brooks & 
Hwong, supra note 18, at 809 ("One important reason why corporate tax revenues [among OECD member 
countries] have increased even though rates have been reduced is that corporate tax profits as a share of GDP 
have increased greatly over the past twenty or so years."). 
45 Id. ("In many countries . . . corporate profits as a percentage of GDP had reached historically 
unprecedented levels just before the worldwide economic meltdown."). 
46 See AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 142; Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 
804 ("[The reduction in the corporate tax rate as a result of the 1986 Tax Act] cut the U.S. tax rate from 46 to 
34 percent.  This reduced rate was more than compensated by base-broadening measures."); but see id. at 
810–11 ("Mooij and Nicodème have recently estimated that as high as over 20 percent of annual corporate 
218  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.5:207 
Over the past few years, prominent tax scholars and analysts have more vocally 
endorsed the proposition that the long-run flattening of personal and corporate income tax 
rates, and the move away from taxation of capital and high-income taxpayers more 
generally to less mobile taxpayers and resources such as consumption and labor, 
seriously distort tax structures while rendering tax systems around the world more 
regressive.47  Reuven Avi-Yonah explains: "[C]ountries that formerly relied on income 
tax revenues now must increase relatively regressive taxes, such as consumption and 
payroll taxes, which in recent years have been the fastest growing taxes in the member 
countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)."48 
A holistic view of global tax trends during the past thirty-five years thus suggests 
that, in order to meet present-day challenges, nations and their tax systems must 
reconsider the available revenue sources—either within or outside the tax realm—as well 
as the alternative of cutting back on government spending, given the risk of revenue 
decline.49  While either option has significant tax implications, both also concern a range 
                                                                                                                                                 
tax revenue can be explained by the shift in the tax base from relatively higher-taxed personal income to 
lower-taxed corporate income."). 
47 See, e.g., Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Offshore Profit Shifting Memorandum, supra 
note 43 (indicating an erosion in corporate tax revenue and a parallel increase in payroll taxes from 1950 to 
2010); Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 795 (concluding that if harmful tax competition is "left unchecked, the 
dire predictions of a twenty-first century world based on the VAT, while perhaps premature, could in time 
still be borne out").  For a discussion of opposing claims that the move toward a greater usage of 
consumption and payroll taxes may not be troubling and, moreover, that it is the very reason why welfare 
states have been able to continue to fund their growing expenditures, see, e.g., Brooks & Hwong, supra note 
18, at 815 (noting that one possible argument for consumption taxes is that "'a revenue shift to regressive 
taxes makes it politically easier to maintain a large public sector'") (quoting JUNO KATO, REGRESSIVE 
TAXATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (2003)).  See also Neil Brooks, A Restatement of the Case for 
Progressive Income Tax, in TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VOLUME IN MEMORY OF RICHARD 
MUSGRAVE 277, 333 (John G. Head & Richard E. Krever eds., 2009) ("[T]he fact that transfers can be 
relatively effective at reducing inequalities has led some commentators to suggest that progressive taxes are 
not needed for achieving a more equal society."); but see Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 818 ("However, 
if there is a case for redistributing from the very rich, because they have no moral claims to their vast 
incomes or because their economic power threatens democratic values and the quality of life in a society, 
then transfer payments cannot, obviously, be used for this purpose.").  Furthermore, with respect to taxing 
labor, such measures may ultimately undermine the supposed economic growth rationale they are meant to 
encourage.  See, e.g., OECD, supra note 25, at 122 ("It is also possible that labour taxes influence foreign 
direct investment adversely by increasing labour cost in the host country.  For instance, [one scholar] found 
that the impact on FDI of labour taxes is generally substantially larger than that of cross-border effective 
corporate tax rates . . . This can hinder technology transfers and spillovers of best practices from 
multinationals to domestic firms . . . ."). 
48 Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 1577; see also OECD, supra note 25, at 27 ("There has been a 
continuously growing share of social security contributions, which by 2007 accounted for 25 per cent of total 
revenues, apart from France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, where the share has decreased."); Avi Yonah, 
supra note 31, at 789 (addressing the regressive nature of alternative methods of raising revenue and arguing 
that "[j]urisdictions that had previously relied on income tax revenues must resultantly supplement their tax 
revenue by raising more regressive taxes," such as taxes on labor and consumption).  Relatively speaking, the 
regressive shift in revenue sources is less evident in the United States.  Here, the shift toward more regressive 
revenue sources at the federal level (e.g., the payroll tax) has been largely offset by increased progressivity of 
the individual income tax, especially at the bottom end where there has been a large growth in refundable 
credits, especially for families with children.  However, putting aside the less than ideal trade-off, these 
trends have substantially restrained the U.S. from making its tax system more progressive in response to 
growing inequality of pretax incomes.  See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office (CBO), THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES, 2010 (December 2013), available at 
http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44604-AverageTaxRates.pdf. 
49 See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 22, at 23 (addressing the tenuous trade-off between increased 
globalization and government provision of a social safety net and stating that "a key component of the 
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of broader and more nuanced policy dilemmas, such as distribution, efficiency, and 
national and societal identity.  Discussing some of these dilemmas, Tsilly Dagan argues 
that with increased globalization the focal point of nations’ public policy has been 
profoundly altered.  According to Dagan: 
The incentive to cater to the preferences of the more attractive and 
mobile among the potential residents and investors pushes policy makers 
to curtail states’ redistribution functions.  It requires them to choose 
between their original constituents and others — possibly more attractive 
ones (in terms of their own political interests as well as . . . the collective 
welfare pie).50 
Underscoring similar issues, a 2010 OECD Tax Policy Reform and Economic 
Growth Report further asserts that "policy makers will need to examine very carefully the 
tradeoff between . . . growth-enhancing proposals and other objectives . . . particularly 
equity."51 
III. AVOIDING THE STRAINS OF GLOBALIZATION – COOPERATION, 
HARMONIZATION AND OTHER TAX RELATED INITIATIVES 
Whatever form the future nation-state takes, globalization offers nations and their 
tax systems both an abundance of benefits and some embedded perils.52  Importantly, 
globalization highlights the value of imposing a measure of restraint on the competitive 
dynamics among nations.  An IMF report advises: 
                                                                                                                                                 
implicit postwar social bargain in the advanced industrial countries has been the provision of social insurance 
and safety nets at home (unemployment compensation, severance payments, and adjustment assistance, for 
example) in exchange for the adoption of freer trade policies"); id. at 26 ("Globalization [and the related 
competition it entails] increas[es] the demand for social insurance while simultaneously constraining the 
ability of governments to respond effectively to that demand.") (emphasis added). 
50 Tsilly Dagan, Dilemmas of Tax Policy in a Globalized World, in TAX LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
57, 59 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds., 2013).  See also Rodrik, supra note 22, at 23 (explaining that 
nations are making drastic changes that significantly affect longtime social customs in order to increase their 
competitiveness in the global economy.  Such changes include, for instance, Japan’s dismantling of its policy 
of lifetime employment and South Korea’s relaxation of its firing restrictions).  For a more recent example, 
consider Michigan’s legislation seeking to limit the ability of unions to negotiate.  One key justification for 
this legislation was that it would encourage U.S. companies to "bring jobs back to the states."  See Brian 
Montopoli, Right-to-Work Signed into Law in Michigan, CBS NEWS, Dec. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57558532/right-to-workpoised-to-become-law-in-michigan/. 
51 OECD, supra note 25, at 24; but see Michael Livingston, From Mumbai to Shanghai with a Side 
Trip to Washington: China, India, and the Future of Progressive Taxation in an Asian-Led World, 11 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 539, 544–45 (2010) ("Even when [progressivity] is accepted as a goal of tax 
policy, [it] may clash with other goals such as economic efficiency, simplicity, or administrability, and 
competitiveness with other nations . . . Beyond that, some . . . nations may simply assign a low priority to tax 
equity, believing that it is more important to let the 'pie get bigger for everyone.'"). 
52 See, e.g., OECD, supra note 26, at 5 (discussing the issue of sub-central tax competition and 
outlining arguments both for and against tax competition).  For a helpful discussion on the benefits of 
globalization, see, e.g., Tanzi, supra note 25, at 6 ("Globalisation obviously leads to a more efficient use of 
capital.  In theory the capital produced . . . can be invested in those areas and countries where they yield more 
. . . I myself have argued repeatedly that perhaps [the capital flight from Latin America] was not altogether a 
bad phenomenon, because . . . while they were abroad they yielded fairly high interest rates, they did not pay 
taxes and accumulated fortunes, which in theory, could return to Latin America."); TYLER COWEN, CREATIVE 
DESTRUCTION (2002) (embracing cross-cultural exchanges brought about by globalization).  For the perils of 
globalization, see, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (discussing the 
shortcoming of global economic theory and the manner in which key institutions of globalization have failed 
developing countries they were meant to help).  
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Globalization can . . . create a framework for cooperation among nations 
on a range of non-economic issues that have cross-border implications, 
such as immigration, the environment, and legal issues.  At the same 
time, the influx of foreign goods, services, and capital into a country can 
create incentives and demands for strengthening the education system 
[among other national infrastructures], as a country’s citizens recognize 
the competitive challenge before them.53 
Monitoring, defusing, and otherwise addressing tax competition would allow 
nations to manage the threat of a competition-driven race to the bottom among them. This 
race undermines their ability to tax and raise revenue, particularly from the most mobile 
resources and taxpayers. 54   Similarly, monitoring and thoughtfully addressing the 
competitive cycle may also safeguard the capacity of nations to utilize their tax systems 
toward goals other than financing basic government goods and services, such as 
redistributing income and improving societal well-being.55 
Policies aimed at addressing international tax competition have been traditionally 
understood to include measures that advance cooperation, harmonization, and integration 
of national tax structures, policies, and administrations.56  Until recently, however, such 
                                                     
53 IMF Staff, supra note 19, at 2; see also Allison Christians, Steven Dean, Diane Ring, & Adam 
Rosenzweig, Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 305 (2008) 
("[T]he miracle [of an international tax regime] is flawed because of the failure of states to agree on an 
increasingly lengthy list of key areas . . . In effect, the flaw . . . is a series of unrelieved collective action 
problems among states, each multiplying the harm of the other . . . The need for revenue to address [growing 
inequality and growing social needs] and the increasing unease about the distributional effects of regulation 
in an economically integrated world, require that this web of collective actions be addressed and, if possible, 
overcome . . . Further, states cannot raise revenue effectively or fairly in the modern international economic 
regime without interacting with other states and their citizens, as people, goods, services, and capital 
increasingly cross global borders."). 
54 For example, the U.S. Congress is concerned about the ability of multinational entities to escape 
paying income tax.  The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearings on Offshore Profit Shifting 
been examined the issue of corporate tax avoidance for the past few years, yet not much has been 
accomplished because of sentiments similar to those of Senator Coburn’s, who wondered whether "it’s too 
risky to tidy up the mess?" (referring to offshore profit shifting engaged in by multinational corporations).  
See Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Offshore Profit Shifting Memorandum, supra note 43.  
Furthermore, CEOs have been circumventing the issue by arguing that there will be no issue to worry about if 
the U.S. merely lowers its corporate rates.  See 60 Minutes: The New Tax Havens (CBS television broadcast 
Mar. 26, 2011), available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7376848n (reporting recent data 
showing that GE paid an effective rate of 3.6% in 2009 and quoting the Cisco CEO as stating that he would 
love to bring jobs back to the U.S., provided that the U.S. lowers its corporate tax rates). 
55 This is desirable because a society in which some taxpayers, such as multinational entities and 
highly skilled workers, receive tax breaks simply because they are more mobile while other, less mobile 
taxpayers, such as lower-skilled workers and consumers, are forced to shoulder a larger share of the tax 
burden, is highly inequitable.  In this scenario "less desirable [also read mobile] individuals may include sick, 
elderly, and poor individuals."  Dagan, supra note 50, at 65. 
56 Pragmatically, breaking down or otherwise defusing the competitive cycle among nations is 
politically challenging.  Consider the extremely difficult political battles for tax revenue centralization within 
various countries alone, let alone on a global scale.  See, e.g., Christina Wagner Faegri & Carol Wise, 
Economic and Fiscal Policy in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 240 (2011) ("The fiscal relationship 
between the provinces and the central government in Argentina stands out as the most complex and volatile 
[compared to other Latin American countries], and, despite several concrete attempts at centralizing tax 
revenue, a fiscal bargain similar to that of Mexico was never reached."); Kathryn James, An Examination of 
Convergence and Resistance in Global Tax Reform Trends, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 475, 484 (2010) 
(discussing state and local reactions to the VAT in the U.S. and explaining that "state and local government 
representatives were concerned about the balance of federal taxing power and feared any intrusion into the 
sales tax area, which is dominated by state and local governments . . . ."). 
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measures have focused more on addressing what are known today as "tax havens" or 
"harmful tax practices," than on advancing broader integration or harmonization.57  In 
1998, the OECD established a special task force to counter the spread of abusive tax 
practices and to implement a code of conduct for business taxation.58  Among other 
actions, the task force drafted an unofficial list of 35 jurisdictions deemed 
"uncooperative."59  The OECD threatened to include these jurisdictions on a "black list," 
pledging severe sanctions if they refused to commit to several steps including a tax 
transparency and information exchange program. 60   As early as 2008, all but three 
jurisdictions complied with the OECD task force demands,61 with none remaining on the 
list by 2009.62  
                                                     
57 While not without its flaws, the OECD’s 1998 initiative played an important role in forming 
international tax relationships for the past decade and a half.  See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf; OECD, 
2000 PROGRESS REPORT: TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING 
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2090192.pdf; OECD, THE 
OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/30901115.pdf; OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: 
2006 UPDATE ON PROGRESS IN MEMBER COUNTIES (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/37446434.pdf.  
58 OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 57, at 8 ("The Report is intended to develop a 
better understanding of how tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes, collectively referred to as 
harmful tax practices, affect the location of financial and other service activities, erode the tax bases of other 
countries, distort trade and investment patterns and undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social 
acceptance of tax systems generally.  Such harmful tax competition diminishes global welfare and 
undermines taxpayer confidence in the integrity of tax systems . . . By discouraging the spread of tax havens 
and harmful preferential tax regimes and encouraging those countries which presently engage in harmful tax 
practices to review their existing measures, the Report will serve to strengthen and to improve tax policies 
internationally."). 
59 Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 784–85 (explaining that the list of uncooperative jurisdictions was 
drafted based on the 1998 OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition as well as a second report, published in 
2000, titled "Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes"). 
60 Id. at 785–87.  Among other relevant steps, the OECD Global Forum on tax information 
exchange was established in 2001 and in 2002 the OECD issued a model Agreement on Exchange of 
Information Issues.  Id. at 786. 
61 Id. 
62 See List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/listofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm (last visited May 7, 2014) ("In a 
report issued in 2000, the OECD identified a number of jurisdictions as tax havens according to criteria it had 
established.  Between 2000 and April 2002, 31 jurisdictions made formal commitments to implement the 
OECD’s standards of transparency and exchange of information.  Seven jurisdictions (Andorra, The 
Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, The Principality of Monaco, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, The 
Republic of Nauru and The Republic of Vanuatu) did not make commitments to transparency and exchange 
of information at that time and were identified in April 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs as 
unco-operative tax havens.  All of these jurisdictions subsequently made commitments and were removed 
from the list of unco-operative tax havens. . . . In May 2009, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs decided to 
remove all three remaining jurisdictions (Andorra, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Principality of 
Monaco) from the list of uncooperative tax havens in the light of their commitments to implement the OECD 
standards of transparency and effective exchange of information and the timetable they set for the 
implementation.  As a result, no jurisdiction is currently listed as an unco-operative tax haven by the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs.").  See also OECD, BETTER POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR POLICY COHERENCE 25 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/pcd/48110465.pdf ("The economic 
crisis and recent cross-border tax evasion scandals have heightened the political drive to ensure rapid 
implementation of the OECD’s tax transparency and information exchange standards, through the OECD-
hosted Global Forum. . . . More than 600 agreements have been signed since April 2009 and many more are 
under negotiation."). 
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The emphasis on tax havens and harmful tax practices is not self-evident and has 
in fact drawn harsh criticism over the years.  Some critics have doubted the actual success 
of the OECD initiative63 while others have viewed it as a smoke screen fashioned to 
target a politically safe problem in order to avoid more difficult conversations about 
fundamental tax reform.64  According to this proposition, the OECD initiative "may . . . 
be seen, at best, as a modest and inadequate effort to counter declining national revenues, 
and perhaps as an issue around which countries can choose to coalesce in order to create 
a basis for further cooperation on tax policy matters."65  
Likewise, harmonization efforts have also received their share of scrutiny.  
Specifically, given the distinctive characteristics of nations and the importance of 
national sovereignty, autonomy and self-expression, the efficiency advantage of 
harmonization, and its merit more generally, have become widely disputed.66  Vito Tanzi, 
for example, cautions that "[we] need[] to be very careful with harmonisation, because 
harmonisation can take place around the most burdensome tax system of the group of 
countries or can take place around a tax system that is so inefficient that the inefficiencies 
                                                     
63 See, e.g., Jason C. Sharman, HAVENS IN A STORM, THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX REGULATION 
(2006) (suggesting that the reduction in the OECD black list was more attributed to the U.S. withdrawal of 
support in 2001 than to actual progress in international cooperation).  See also David Spancer & Jason C. 
Sharman, International Tax Cooperation, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 35 (2007);  David Spancer 
& Jason C. Sharman, International Tax Cooperation, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 27 (2008); 
David Spancer & Jason C. Sharman, International Tax Cooperation, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
39 (2008) (finding that little progress has been made in reducing tax havens practices).  But cf. Avi-Yonah, 
supra note 31 (concluding that the OECD efforts have been successful based on data that suggests no decline 
in individual or corporate tax revenues in OECD member countries over the decade proceeding the 1998 
initiative while showing a decline in corporate tax revenues in non-OECD countries over the same period).   
64 Allison Christians, Taxation in the Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the OECD to the G20, 
5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 19, 28 (2010) (discussing the G20 and explaining that "[T]hese troublesome factors 
raise difficult questions about the G20’s focus on tax havens, especially since there is no indication offered to 
date that the elimination of tax havens is a top priority for developing countries.  Instead, the G20’s attention 
to global tax policy appears to be an effort to both attain a greater international acceptance of tax policy 
priorities articulated by the OECD and to avoid a more politically difficult conversation about the increasing 
incapacity of national tax systems to meet revenue demands, especially in times of economic instability.").  
65 Id. at 28.  The OECD task force was also criticized for ignoring tax haven-like behavior in many 
countries, including the U.S.  See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf (questioning the credibility and motivation behind the OECD 
"black list"); Allison Christians, Sovereignty Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99, 119 
(2009) ("What the OECD calls 'encouraging' and 'assisting' is interpreted by some as an unjustified use of 
force purely for self-interested ends.").  Furthermore, the political feasibility of the OECD’s ending all 
competitive activities is low.  See discussion on globalization and tax competition in supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text as well as infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, Agglomeration, Integrations, and Tax 
Harmonization, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 1, 21 (2004); Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in 
Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259 (2003); Carl Gaigne & Stephane Riou, Globalization, Asymmetric Tax 
Competition, and Fiscal Equalization, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 910, 920 (2007); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing 
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 1357 (2001); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax 
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543 (2001).  Dean, for example, questions the emphasis on tax harmonization as 
the solution for nations to avoid international tax conflicts by becoming more alike.  See Steven Dean, More 
Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 125, 128–29 (2009).  He subsequently makes a case for deharmonization—cooperation without 
uniformity—as a viable alternative.  Id. 
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of one country are passed on to all the other countries." 67   Addressing the broader 
implications of harmonization, other scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the 
OECD to set the tone, serve as an authority, and lead worldwide initiatives "when OECD 
member countries represent a declining share of global gross domestic product."68 
Finally, although addressing tax competition has become a high priority in an 
increasingly globalized world, efforts by individual countries to strengthen tax 
administration are no less important.69  Such efforts, however, remain largely unrealized, 
resulting in significant revenue loss.  Senator Levin, for example, estimates that $4 
million per day is lost due to U.S. corporate tax avoidance,70 while Gravelle puts the 
figure at $10 to $60 billion per year.71 
IV. TRENDS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN AN 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 
As nations draw closer—either intentionally or unintentionally—toward an all-
inclusive, homogenous world, globalization can be understood to lead inevitably to 
convergence of national identities and policies. 72   In this light, globalization is 
complemented by a unified approach to taxation that transcends national boundaries and 
jurisdictions.73  The area of corporate taxation is a good example of such convergence.  
                                                     
67 Tanzi, supra note 25, at 10 (adding that: "Therefore fiscal harmonisation has to be considered 
carefully."). 
68 Christians, supra note 64, at 33–34. 
69 For an interesting discussion that considers tax administration an integral part of nations’ tax 
mix, see generally Dean, supra note 66.  See also Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific?  Lessons 
from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 725 (2010) 
(exploring history pre- and post-enactment of Britain’s model Income Tax Ordinance in Palestine after World 
War II and highlighting the key role tax administrations played in that context).  Likhovski explains that 
many discretionary compromises were made in adapting the income tax, for example in the treatment of tax 
evasion.  Id. at 757.   
In the report for 1942-43, the Commissioner noted that evasion was fairly widespread, but “having 
regard to the fact that income tax has been but recently introduced in Palestine, it was decided, as a matter of 
policy, not to take any action [by imposing] . . . penalties for the making of incorrect returns and fraudulent 
acts.”  Id. 
70 See 159 CONG. REC. S6658 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2013) (statement of Sen. Levin).  For an 
informative discussion of corporate tax avoidance estimates, see, e.g., Senate Floor Statement on Introducing 
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, SEN. CARL LEVIN (Sept. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/senate-floor-statement-on-introducing-the-stop-tax-
haven-abuse-act.  
71 GRAVELLE, supra note 65, at 16–19 (discussing empirical literature and indicating that estimates 
on the revenue loss caused by corporate tax avoidance significantly vary).  Gravelle also includes tables 
showing the percentage of U.S. profits as a percentage of foreign GDP.  Id. at 14–15.  For example, in 
Bermuda, such profits amounted to an astounding 646% of the country’s GDP in 2008, indicating that 
"profits [were not derived] from economic motives related to productive inputs or markets, but rather reflect 
income easily transferred to low-tax jurisdictions."  Id. at 15. 
72 See, e.g., James, supra note 56, at 475 ("Notwithstanding a wide divergence in government and 
institutional structures, electoral systems, and social political values, there has often been a convergence of 
tax systems in Western democracies."); OECD, supra note 35, at 3 ("[D]espite there being 34 countries in the 
OECD, trends in tax rates and burdens show more common themes than differences."). 
73 See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 1 (2007) ("[A] coherent international tax regime exists, embodied in both 
the tax treaty network and in domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of international law . . . The 
practical implication is that countries are not free to adopt any international tax rules they please, but rather 
operate in the context of the regime, which changes in the same way international law changes over time.  
Thus, unilateral action is possible, but is also restricted, and countries are generally reluctant to take unilateral 
actions that violate the basic norms that underlie the regime."). 
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As Avi-Yonah, Sartori, and Marian show, since the mid-1980s and well into the 2000s, 
most industrialized nations have been implementing very similar reforms to broaden their 
corporate tax bases.74  These commonly include (1) eliminating or significantly reducing 
investment credits; (2) replacing generous accelerated depreciations with depreciation 
rules that more closely reflect the life of assets; and (3) introducing limitations on interest 
deductions.75 
A degree of convergence is not surprising in the context of income taxation 
because the structural considerations factored into the design and administration of 
income tax systems tend to be similar across jurisdictions. 76   Similarities exist not 
because there are no differences among nations, but because globalization significantly 
levels the playing field.77  Stated differently, given the effect of globalization across 
countries, convergence emerges as a natural phenomenon as cooperative strategies prove 
beneficial and markets open toward one another. 78   In fact, functional comparatists 
commonly argue that convergence is not only an easily observed phenomenon, but also a 
desirable practice.79  It is viewed as beneficial because "there is little sense in adopting 
different legal rules that are aimed at dealing with similar . . . problems and to achieve 
similar results."80  Accordingly,  the seeming heterogeneity across countries—whether in 
taxation or otherwise—may merely disguise innate similarities.81 
Importantly, despite the forces working toward convergence, an absolute 
convergence of tax systems driven by a dramatic "race to the bottom" of tax rates and 
bases remains unlikely.82  Several domestic factors, such as the size of public sector debt, 
act as counterweights to tax competition.83  In addition, attracting economic resources 
requires more than offering preferential tax treatment.  In a statement on International 
Tax Issues before the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Jane Gravelle observed that "most [U.S.] stocks held in foreign firms are in firms in 
developed countries with similar tax rates to those of the U.S., not firms in low tax 
                                                     
74 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 113–14, 142–43. 
75 Id. 
76 See supra note 11, and accompanying text. 
77 See, e.g., Robert T. Kudrle, Governing Economic Globalization: The Pioneering Experience of 
the OECD, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 695 (2012) (explaining that "[e]conomic globalization demands national 
policy accommodation"); cf. Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax 
and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 160–61 (2008) (suggesting that "a sovereign state must exhibit 
some de facto external independence," but that, at the same time, it is "never a truly absolute quality"). 
78 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 18, and accompanying text. 
79 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 4–5 (discussing the functionalist approach to 
taxation and analyzing Carlo Garbarino's scholarship as a good example of a functionalist tax analysis). 
80 Id. 
81 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 4.  The OECD’s model for international 
transfer pricing standards is another example of a legal standard adopted across different jurisdictions (albeit 
with differences in its administration), because  
[t]he incomplete and inconsistent application of international standards, inadequate legislation, or a 
lack of basic tax capacity in developing countries can mean that transfer prices used by MNEs may 
depart from the arm’s length standard and lead to profits being shifted to low-tax jurisdictions, 
resulting in a lower revenue for normal rate jurisdictions, including developing countries.  
OECD, BETTER POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 62, at 25. 
82 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 139–40 (indicating, for example, a trend of 
corporate rate divergence over the past decade).  See also supra note 36. 
83 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 139 (citing Duane Swank & Steven Steinmo, 
The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalistic Democracies, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 642 
(2002)). 
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countries."84  To the extent that these firms keep their investments in the developed 
world, such evidence counters the common assumption that tax rates are the sole or even 
predominant factor in determining investment decisions.  Rather, investments are more 
likely to be made based on a mix of considerations, including the availability and quality 
of local goods and services, which can be severely undermined by declining revenues if 
countries excessively indulge in preferential tax offerings.85 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the homogenizing influence of convergence, 
globalization may also lead to divergence as nations find it beneficial to draw on their 
individual strengths to gain competitive advantages.86  In fact, the undertone of most 
comparative tax analyses continues to demonstrate that "the most obvious finding is 
divergence" 87  and that, so far, "convergence is a relatively narrow phenomenon . . . 
limited to certain aspects of the tax system, primarily its corporate and international 
provisions."88  Notably, in any jurisdiction law is but one piece of a broader cultural 
puzzle, which draws on unique local conditions.  The assertion that structural tax 
problems and solutions across different jurisdictions are similar can therefore be seen as 
both inaccurate and misleading.89  On this view, "harmonization projects . . . that call—
by definition—for the annulment of cultural identity as expressed in the unique laws of a 
given society . . . [may not only be rejected as undesirable but could also present] an 
unattainable goal, since cultural and political differences are irreconcilable."90 
As Kathryn James explains, taxation is "fundamentally about the rules of the 
game that determine, amongst other things, the level of social spending in society, the 
distribution of property among social groups, and the concentration of power . . . ."91  
                                                     
84 Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in 
the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers, supra note 28, at 6 (statement of Jane Gravelle) 
(emphasis added). 
85 Id. (emphasizing that "portfolio investors are concerned with the overall return (governed by 
overall tax rules) and not the details of a country’s foreign tax regime"); cf. AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & 
MARIAN, supra note 1, at 140 (discussing FDI in the context of MNEs’ activity and citing Joshua D. Moore, 
The Economic Importance of Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: An Analysis of International 
Corporate Tax Harmonization Proposals and Lessons from Winning Corporate Tax Strategy in Ireland, 20 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J 345, 357 (2007) ("[B]ecause MNEs benefit from tax expenditures 
and provisions of public goods and services, they are unlikely to derive the rates to zero.")). 
86 See, e.g., James, supra note 56, at 496 ("The mere fact that VAT reform was so controversial in 
Australia and Canada and remains elusive in the U.S. challenges this presumption of necessary 
convergence."). 
87 Avi-Yonah, supra note 18, at 1 ("If one compares any two national tax laws, the most obvious 
finding is divergence.  Tax law reflects specific national histories, cultures and interests, and not surprisingly 
they differ."). 
88 Id. at 5.  In these areas, convergence may be a positive phenomenon to the extent that it reduces 
the scope of tax arbitrage where taxpayers manipulate the discrepancies among tax systems of different 
jurisdictions to minimize their tax liability.  Id. 
89 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 7; Marian, supra note 2, at 465 ("Tax law is 
very much about local context.  It is the very essence of the political orientation of any regime in any given 
jurisdiction . . . [and] is used expressly to promote political agendas."). 
90 AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 7 (adding that "rather, . . . comparative 
analysis should be aimed at understanding the cultural; social; political; and ultimately, the legal identities of 
'the other.'  In turn, such 'understanding' should serve us better 'when reflecting on our own legal rules and 
cultural identity.'"); Likhovski, supra note 69, at 761 ("Many participants in the debate about legal 
transplantation and the autonomy of the law assume that law is autonomous and independent of the society 
which it governs or, alternatively, that it reflects that society.  But in fact law is both autonomous and related 
to society, depending on the specific phase in the life of the law that we are examining and the actors we are 
interested in."). 
91 James, supra note 56, at 496. 
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While "these issues might be universal . . . there are clear differences as well as 
similarities in the way in which societies respond to [them] . . . ." 92   In this light, 
divergence is both to be expected and valuable.93  As long as there are differences among 
societies, convergence will never be complete.94 
In fact, forces of convergence and divergence may operate at the same time, 
pulling nations in opposite directions and at times—either partially or completely—
negating each other.  Comparing the Canadian General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) 
with its Chinese counterpart, Jinyan Li argues, for example, that even though both 
GAARs appear similar on paper, they diverge in several fundamental respects, including 
the challenges addressed, the motivations behind their enactment, and their application 
and effects.  Li adds, however, that because the Canadian and Chinese GAARs affect 
their tax systems from almost opposite directions, they end up bringing the two systems 
closer together.95 
Ultimately, the existing literature suggests that the likely, particularly long-term, 
outcomes of globalization, even tax competition, are unclear.96  The ability of capital to 
move where it can be used most productively can enhance the growth and efficiency of 
local markets.97  Additionally, while any downward or regressive pressures on the tax 
base and rates are expected to adversely affect public outlays, another trend is likely to 
work in the opposite direction, stimulating increased public spending on local 
infrastructures to manage the upshots of modernization and global competition.98  These 
                                                     
92 Id. 
93 Avi-Yonah, supra note 18, at 1–5 (discussing elements of convergence and divergence in 
taxation). 
94 See, e.g., AVI-YONAH, SARTORI, & MARIAN, supra note 1, at 7–9; cf. Mathias Reimann, The 
Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
671 (2002) (exploring convergence and divergence in the common and civil law). 
95 Li, supra note 13, at 658; James, supra note 56, at 495–96 ("[W]hile consumption tax reform in 
Australia, Canada and the United States was, and remains, highly controversial, these controversies are often 
the product of different configurations of key political and economic factors, which pull in competing 
directions towards convergence and divergence in tax reform outcomes.").  James adds, more generally, that 
"[t]he VAT-reform experience of . . . [Australia, Canada, and the United States] encapsulates the tension that 
arises from a tendency among developed tax systems to convergence against frequent and often fierce 
localized opposition."  Id. at 475; Likhovski, supra note 69, at 761 (discussing the simultaneous convergence 
and divergence that occurred in implementing the Palestinian income tax).  Likhovski concludes that 
"[u]ltimately what we are left with is a confusing picture, which is the result of opposing forces, each pulling 
in a different direction."  Id. 
96 For a good explanation on why globalization and tax competition theories offer conflicting 
results, consider Eric Toder’s remarks on tax incentives and behavior: "Correlation between two variables 
does not imply that one change causes the other and there are usually many aspects of a taxpayer’s situation 
that are changing at the same time, confounding attempts to identify the separate effect of the incentive being 
studied."  Responses to Tax Incentives in a Complex and Uncertain Law Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 112th 
Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Eric Toder, Fellow at Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr.). 
97 See, e.g., CHRIS EDWARDS & DANIEL L. MITCHELL, GLOBAL TAX REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF TAX 
COMPETITION AND THE BATTLE TO DEFEND IT (2008); Tanzi, supra note 25; cf. Avi-Yonah, supra note 27, at 
1614 ("A fundamental assumption of the studies [suggesting that tax competition impairs the ability of 
nations to best service the needs of their citizens] is that governments are benevolent—that they seek to 
maximize the utility of their residents.  However, governments may also be considered Leviathans that seek 
to maximize their revenues in their own self-interest without regard for the good of the general citizenry.  
From this perspective, tax competition may be beneficial because it constrains governments’ tendency to 
grow."). 
98 Vito Tanzi, Globalization and the Need for Fiscal Reform in Developing Countries, 26 J. POL. 
MODELING 525 (2004); Hines & Summers, supra note 19, at 124 ("[T]he economic costs of raising tax 
revenue are particularly worrisome in an environment in which governments face significant demands on 
2014]  THE INTRICACIES OF TAX AND GLOBALIZATION 227 
include, for example, additional funding needed for tackling increasing rates of 
inequality99 and the rise in longevity and in the cost of public goods and services.100  
Furthermore, economic activity, including investments and other productive endeavors, is 
likely to be pursued where it is most profitable.  Profitability, however, relies heavily on 
the availability and quality of national infrastructures, such as law enforcement and the 
monetary system, which, in turn, depend on taxation.101 
The evidence on the effect of globalization on public expenditure, however, is yet 
again inconclusive. 102   Likewise, as Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law 
illustrates, while globalization may lead to at least some observed trends in taxation—
including the flattening of income tax rates and the move toward the taxation of less 
mobile sources, and thus more regressive, tax schemes—there is clearly far more than 
meets the eye.  Here, Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law provides a valuable 
reference for how different countries confront challenges that are common among tax 
systems.  Keeping in mind that differences among national tax systems nonetheless exist 
and understanding how tax systems converge and diverge constitutes a vital first step 
toward crystallizing the necessary actions to better coordinate between multiple tax 
systems while retaining national sovereignty in tax design.  Over the long run, this could 
also lead to better evaluation of the net benefit or cost of globalization, allowing 
policymakers to respond effectively to the fiscal challenges that globalization presents. 
                                                                                                                                                 
their resources . . . [these demands] put pressures on government to . . . respond in ways that help their 
populations thrive in more global competitive markets.  Social welfare programs have for many years served 
the first of these functions and education and training programs the second; all of these are expensive, so 
there is understandable interest in the ability of government to maintain their funding . . . .").  However, 
"since location choices, activity levels, and taxable incomes are sensitive to local taxes, it stands to reason 
that governments would feel intensifying pressure to reduce tax burdens on business activities, investors, and 
possibly high net worth individuals."  Id. 
99 IMF, supra note 39, at 10 (explaining that while there is evidence to suggest that increased 
inequality may be caused more by technological changes than globalization and the related expansion of the 
VAT, governments are likely to be called upon to assist those who are adversely affected, and particularly to 
provide more income support and training for low-skilled workers who lose their jobs as the flow of trade 
increases); Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, Global Production Sharing and Raising Inequality: A 
Survey of Trade and Wages, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 146 (E. Kwan Chio & James 
Harrington eds., 2004) (reviewing evidence suggesting that globalization has contributed significantly to 
income inequality). 
100 See, e.g., Brooks & Hwong, supra note 18, at 800–01 (explaining, for example, that "somewhat 
paradoxically, globalization itself increases the need for taxation because it increases the instability of 
economies and the economic insecurity of workers; this in turn should lead to an increased demand for social 
insurance schemes"). 
101 Kenneth Stewart & Michael Webb, International Competition in Corporate Taxation: Evidence 
from the OECD Time Series, 45 ECONOMIC POLICY 153 (2006) (discussing business activity). 
102 Some studies suggest, for example, that increased trade openness may stimulate higher 
government spending, but that increased trade openness combined with financial globalization leads to lower 
government spending.  IMF, supra note 39, at 10 (citing literature).  According to the IMF: 
While these results are not necessarily inconsistent . . . they do not provide definitive conclusions 
one way or the other on the implementation for spending.  Moreover, they are only partial in that 
they tend to focus on central government expenditure . . . which is a problem to the extent that 
globalization leads central governments to make room for new spending by offloading 
responsibility for some existing programs onto local government. 
Id. at 10–11. 
